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INFORMATION SYSTEMS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND
THEIR EFFECTS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
Eric K. Clemons and Steven 0. Kimbrough
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania

ABSTRACT
There is general agreement among academic researchers that information systems can

prove strategic if they are well crafted. However, the field currently lacks frameworks
that predict which applications might provide lasting benefit and sustainable competitive
advantage. Moreover, little has been attempted in analyzing effects on the organization of
industry. These effects may, in the long term, prove at least as interesting as effects on
individual firms. We present here an initial examination of the effects of information
systems and telecommunications on the competitive position of firms. Our intention is to
provide guidelines for choosing opportunities that convey sustainable competitive advan-

tage. We present also an initial analysis of predicted changes in the organization of
industry. This work draws on field research and on recent work in market economics.

INTRODUCTION

assessing options and choosing preferred strate-

A growing literature attests to the fact that in-

There are firms that, through well-timed and

gies, seem yet more distant.

formation systems can be used as competitive
weapons within the context of a market
economy (Clemons, et al., 1984; Clemons and
McFarlan, 1986; Harris, 1985; Ives and Learmonth, 1984; Jonscher, 1983; McFarlan, 1984;
Petre, 1984; Porter, 1985; Rackoff, 1985;
Wiseman, 1985). This literature largely relies
on a common and perhaps overworked collection of examples that plausibly demonstrate use

well-crafted applications, have achieved reduced

costs or enhanced service for their customers,

leading to improved margins or increased
market share; perhaps they have also gained
Merrill
sustainable competitive advantage.
Lynch Cash Management Accounts, American
Hospital Supply and McKesson Drug Company
distribution systems, and American Airlines and
United Airlines reservation systems are among
the most widely-cited examples of such applications. Many others are known. There have also
been mistakes, of which very little is written.

of information systems to gain competitive advantage. Since the authors' tone is generally
evangelical, the examples selected are those that

can be described as major successes. Unhappily,
neither the literature not the oral tradition goes
into much depth; both are largely anecdotal.
Little is understood by way of general principles
or theory about why certain moves work or are

For examples of the benefits of successful stra-

tegic choices and of the costs of mistakes, we

look initially to financial services and banking.
Cash Management Accounts (CMAs), introduced by Merrill Lynch in the late '70's during a

likely to work, or why others fail. Still less is

known about the longer-term organizational effects on industry of existing or anticipated information systems technologies. Normative and
predictive models, which would be valuable for

period of high inflation and high interest rates,
successfully drew billions of dollars out of banks
and out of savings and loan institutions. Now,
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more than six years later, Merrill Lynch still enjoys an enormous market share advantage -over half the CMA volume, and several times
the share of its nearest competitor. Contrast

that with automated teller machines (ATMs),
offered by virtually all major banks. Most industry observers acknowledge that the universal
adoption of ATMs has benefitted the substantial
portion of retail customers who use them. How-

ever, since ATMs are offered by almost all
banks, they have conferred neither margin nor
market share advantage. Moreover, they do not
appear to have reduced banks' expenses; customers use them frequently, as cash machines, but
do not appear to be substantially reducing either
papers transactions or their need for interaction

with bank personnel. Finally, in the area of
electronic home banking, we find banks that

have invested millions of dollars in developing
and advertising the service. Consumer demand
for home banking, however, appears minimal.

No bank has successfully exploited the service
as a means of increasing share or margins, or of
reducing costs.
How can we explain the differences in these applications? CMAs have been widely copied and
are generally available. yet the original deve-

loper continues not only to benefit, but to

dominate. This surely looks like sustainable
competitive advantage.
ATMs likewise are
generally available, yet they appear to have conferred competitive advantage on none of their
offering banks; rather, they appear only to have
increased costs throughout the industry. And at
present, both of these appear successful when
compared to electronic home banking, which is
largely being ignored by consumers.
Unexplained as these differences are, we do not
believe them unexplainable. The main goal of
this paper is to put forward several, hypotheses

STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE:
DISTINCTIONS AND
DEFINITIONS
There has been much attention paid to strategic
information systems applications in the popular
press. Articles are frequently found in the New

York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and

Fortune Magazine. Business Week recently
ran a cover story on "Information Power"
(Harris, 1985). The treatment in these sources
certainly helps to advance general awareness of

the possibilities inherent in information sys-

tems, and it probably enhances the belief that
information systems can be essential components of corporate strategy. And yet we find this

treatment, as well as that in the academic literature, in many ways quite deficient. By way of
introducing our own framework for analysis, we
begin with four basic points:

1. Innovation that results in greater ef-

ficiency - doing something better may or may not yield competitive

advantage.
2. What is essential for doing business
may or may not be strategically important.

3. What is strategically important may
or may not yield competitive advan-

tage.
4. Competitive advantage may or may

not be lasting.

Better Operations May Not be Strategic

on the organizational effects on industry of information
systems
technology.
These
hypotheses, we believe, are plausible and supported by what evidence is now available.

better and Raining competitive advantaRe.

Within information systems technology, our

something better need not confer competitive

main emphasis will be on telecommunications
technology, although we recognize that no fast

distinction can be made between telecom-

munications and other applications of information systems. For present purposes, what

counts as a telecommunications application is

one in which the movement of information over

a significant distance matters critically in figuring the·value of the given application of IS technology.
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First, we distinguish between doing somethinR

Surely, if you gain competitive advantage you
likely are doing something better, but doing
advantage. If there is something to be done better (e.g., faster, cheaper) and everyone can do it

easily, then everyone will, and the competitive
scene will remain unaltered. To take an IS example, consider automating payroll. It is clearly
cheaper to do so than to rely on a manual system, but the means to do so are available to all.
Consequently, all firms of a reasonable size have
automated their payrolls and none has altered
its competitive position.

The distinction between doing things better and
gaining competitive advantage is often lost or

blurred in the IS literature. Porter notes that,
"A technology is important for competition if it
significantly affects a firm's competitive advantage or industry structure" (Porter, 1985). Much

of the literature, however, is concerned with

Clearly, information systems will continue to be
useful, even essential. Will they continue to be
strategic?
How, and to what extent, will

communications- based

applications yield op-

portunities for firms to gain advantage or to
radically alter the structure of an industry?2

showing that firms have projects of strategic im-

portance to them and that these projects often
depend on IS. For example, "Information tech-

Strategic Importance Need Not
Confer Advantage

nology can be used to support or shape the

firm's competitive strategy by supporting or
shaping strategic thrusts. Strategic thrusts,
therefore, constitute the mechanisms for connecting

business

strategy

technology" (Rackoff, 1985).

and

information

Given the per-

vasiveness of information systems, it would be

very surprising if they did not often figure as

components in so-called strategic thrusts; so do
labor and raw materials.

This takes us to our third distinction, that between what is strategically important and what
confers competitive advantage A firm has

competitive advantage if it is able to obtain
returns on its investments n a given industry)

that are better than normal. Clearly, anything
that gives good promise of yielding competitive
advantage is strategically important. But some-

thing that threatens the competitive position of

a firm (and hence alters industry structure

Even Essential Systems May Not
Be Strategic
With regard to our second point, there is no
doubt that information systems are becoming
ever more pervasive in business. The computer

and communications industry continues to draw
an increasing share of the GNP at the same time
that it consistently improves price/performance
indices. None of this, however, necessarily implies that either computing or communications
is strategically important to anyone who uses

them.1 Our second distinction, then, is between

significantly) is also strategically important.
Something may be strategically important not
because it confers advantage, but because failing
to attend to it results in strategic disadvantage.

Actions may need to be taken out of strategic
necessity, a point we reexamine later.

Advantage May Not Be Sustainable

Our fourth and final distinction is between
temporary and lasting (or sustainabld) competi-

what is strategically important and what is

tive advantage.

essential for doing business Information systems are, without question, essential for doing

better than normal returns on investments may

business; so is air. But usually all industry participants have full and equal access to air.

But if competitors can duplicate the effect

Something is strategic if it significantly affects
either the competitive position of a firm or the
structure of its industry (see Porter, 1980, 1985;
Ives and Learmonth, 1984). For an IS applica-

tion to be strategically important, it is not
enough that it be essential to doing business;
firms must also differ in their ability to develop

or to exploit this application. These differences
among firms can have many origins; difference
in technical skills, available financial resources,
or technical infrastructures are possible.
lof course, they must be strategically important to the
sellers of these products. but that's a different matter.

Projects that, for example,

reduce costs and thereby permit realization of
loosely be said to confer competitive advantage.

quickly, whatever advantage was achieved is
only temporary. Projects of this sort are nice to
find, but should be analyzed much as any other
capital budgeting investment. It is misleading to
speak of them as being strategically important.

Our practice will be to speak of an IS invest-

ment as yielding competitive advantage only if

.

-

2For present purposes we can use Porter's model of in-

dustry structure as consisting of five factors:

suppliers.

buyers, new entrants, industry competitors, and substitutes.

Industry structure changes when the power relationships
among these factors changes significantly.

3Whether normal should be defined in terms of the in-

dustry as a whole or in terms of investments as a whole is an
issue we leave open at present.

101

the advantage is sufficiently long-lived to be
considered as altering industry structure.
distinction is genuine, even if imprecise.

The

As Porter notes:

Even if the technological change is

imitated, therefore, it will lead to a

competitive advantage for a firm if it
skews drivers in the firm's favor. For
example, a new assembly process that
is more scale-sensitive than the pre-

SOURCES OF ADVANTAGE

vious process will benefit a large-

With these distinctions and definitions before
us,
it
is
perhaps
less obvious that
telecommunications-based
applications
are

strategically important to their users. And if
this is obvious, it is certainly not obvious how
telecommunications can confer strategic advan-

tage. On technology in general, Porter (1985)

identifies four factors that may allow a tech-

nological change to yield sustainable competitive
advantage.
1. The technological change itself
lowers cost of enhanced differentia-

tion and the firm's technological

share firm that pioneers it even if
competitors eventually
technology (p. 172).

adopt

the

While it is far from obvious what particular effects telecommunications-based applications
will have in this regard, it is likely that scale effects will be significant only for massively com-

plex and costly implementations.

First-mover advantages, the third factor above,
will figure importantly in what follows. Impor-

tant questions have to do with how extensive
these opportunities are. It may be that the well
known success stories of strategic use of

lead is sustainable.

telecommunications rely on such first-mover ef-

2. The technological change shifts cost
or uniqueness drivers in favor of a
firm.

fects and that opportunities of this sort are rare.

Finally, there is the case of improved industry
structure. In fact, in one of the examples cited

3. Pioneering the technological change
translates
into first-mover advantages besides those inherent in
the technology itself.

above, airline reservations, it can be argued that

the publicized strategic applications actually
harmed industry structure by reducing profits of
all participants.

4. The technological change improves
overall industry structure
(pp.
171-176).

What, then, can be said about the strategic importance of telecommunications? The current
trends in technology and in pricing are producing a movement away from private networks
and towards measured service via regulated or
unregulated common carriers. Communications
services will be available to all, and at competitive prices. Communications alone, therefore,
cannot be the basis of sustainable advantage.
For example, telemarketing has proven to be a

tremendously effective marketing tool, but
anyone can hire people to make telephone calls.
It would surely seem then, that it will be the ap-

plication systems rather than the telecommunications network that conveys advantage.

Porter's second condition is perhaps more
promising in the case of telecommunications.
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INFORMATION SYSTEMS CAN
BE STRATEGIC
McKesson Drug Company is a widely publicized

innovator in the use of interorganizational information systems (Corey, 1985; Kleinfield,
1984) for support of customers. McKesson's
systems' most obvious effect is in support of

customers' order entry; in fact, the system helps
the customers in all aspects of running their
pharmacies.
To place an order the store clerk walks through
the retail store, waving a wand bar-code reader
at any item in limited supply; the product is

recorded on a small cassette recorder. When a
circuit of the store is finished, the clerk can dial
(or auto-dial) McKesson's computer, which
reads the cassette and creates an order, reorder-

ing each item requested in the customer's standard reorder quantity. Order entry couldn't be
much easier.

generalizing hypotheses are suggested here? We
begin to answer the question by making a small

Items are shipped to pharmacies already

It would be surprising if it were possible to have
a solid theory of the strategic uses of telecommunications without linking that theory to current thinking in the field of industry organization. If telecommunications is used for competi-

marked with the individual pharmacy's current
prices, which are stored on McKesson's compu-

ter. Additionally, McKesson has the floor plan

of each retail operation with which it deals and
items are placed in boxes in reverse order of that
in which they will be needed; that is, the items

appeal to theory.

tive advantage, then industry structure will
change, and one would expect that such specific
cases would exemplify more general principles.
In fact, we believe that at least part of the litera-

encountered on the first shelves will be on the
top of the shipment. The customer thus restocks by making one circuit through the store,

ture in industry organization is quite pertinent

removing prepriced items and placing them on
shelves. Like order entry, restocking could not
be much easier.

McKesson provides rapid and reliable restocking; combined with easy and inexpensive reor-

dering, this leads the customer to reorder only
when supply is needed rather than batching or-

ders and maintaining safety stock. McKesson
also provides additional services to their customers, including a billing service to support
house charge accounts and a database of drug
interactions and counter- indications.

This really does appear to be a pretty piece of
work. Assessing benefits to McKessons customers is far easier and far more direct than assessing benefits to McKesson. It is problematic

to determine if McKesson enjoys margins

to gaining an understanding of the strategic effects of telecommunications.
In a series of widely cited works, Oliver Williamson has developed what he calls the trans-

action cost approach to the study of industrial

organization (1979, 1981, 1985). This approach
proceeds:
...by

making

the

transaction-

rather than commodities-the basic
unit of analysis and by assessing
governance structures, of which firms
and markets are the leading alternatives, in terms of their capacities to
economize on transaction costs
(Williamson, 1980. p. 549).

Williamson believes that much of industrial or-

greater than average for its industry or it is has
substantially increased market share. The principle result of this system may have been limited
to change in industry structure, the driving out
of small local distributors. However, the principle factor of this system - ease of use and
reduced (nonfinancial) transaction costs for cus-

ganization, especially organizational boundaries,

tomers - warrants more formal analysis.

tempting to economize on such transaction
costs, firms have various organizational options,

turn to this in the following section.

We

can be explained by appealing to firms's attempts

to

lower

their

transaction

costs.

Williamson's central idea is a simple one and
can be stated as follows. Economic exchanges
themselves have costs. Certain types of exchanges are more costly than others. In at-

principally the option of acquiring the goods in
the marketplace or producing the goods within
the firm. That is, transaction costs affect the

Transaction Costs
The McKesson example plausibly shows, at the
very least, that telecommunications can be used

to affect industry structure. McKesson may or
may not have gained competitive advantage
with its automated ordering system, but an over.
all effect has certainly been to reduce the num.
ber of players in the industry. Telecommunications, in this example, is strategically important,
and the application resulted in something-4n.
ventory reordering4eing done better. What
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make-vs.-buy decision and Williamson holds
this decision to be very significant in determining much of industrial organization.

To illustrate, buying light bulbs is a transaction
inherently less costly than buying, say, legal advice. Contracting for light bulbs is straightforward for both supplier and purchaser. Light
bulbs are standard, known quantities, about
which there is little ambiguity. Moreover, the
supplier does not make any large transactionspecific investment. If the supplier loses a cus-

tomer, the investment in infrastructure to

action costs, as opposed to pure production costs,

produce the bulbs can be recovered by selling

may be the rule rather than the exception for

the light bulbs elsewhere.

The case of legal advice is different in at least
two ways. First, it is very difficult to specify unambiguously what the purchaser is buying; thus,
argues Williamson, the purchaser must expend
effort to monitor the contract for services, lest
when interests diverge the lawyers extract extra
benefits at the expense of the client. Second, it
is often the case that much of what an attorney
would learn in providing services is firmspecific. The investment made to acquire such
knowledge is not transferable to other clients.
The former condition gives the supplier power
over the purchaser, while the second condition
confers power to the purchaser. The net result
of this, in Williamson's view, is much haggling
about what is to be done and consequent loss of
resources. The main recourse for a purchasing
firm in such a case is to develop the capacity inhouse to provide the needed service. And we
note that few firms make their own light bulbs,
but many have their own legal departments.

strategically important telecommunications systems.

HYPOTHESES
Conditions Necessary for Sustainable
Competitive Advantage
Our working hypothesis is that interorganizational information systems that convey sustainable competitive advantage will possess all of the
following characteristics:
1. They will reduce costs or add value
for customers and users. The most

attractive way to reduce costs is to
reduce transaction costs, making
systems easier for customers to use
without reducing vendor prices.

2. They will entail substantial switch-

Williamson offers no precise definition of transaction costs, as opposed to other costs. For our
purposes, the transaction costs of an economic

ing costs (also called idiosyncratic
investment) on the part of the custol
nner or user.

exchange can be characterized as the costs of

making the exchange happen satisfactorily.

3. There will be a small window of opportunity. Alternatively, and more
formally, we can state this by saying
that the ratio of customer adoption

These are to be distinguished from the costs of
actually producing the goods exchanged. Thus,

for example, in purchasing a car the costs of the
transaction include shopping around for the car,
negotiating a price, arranging for financing, and

waiting for delivery.
,

time to competitor copy time is quite

If the dealer must be

prodded to meet the full terms of the agreement
of sale, then both the cost of the prodding and
the cost of the monitoring to determine that

prodding is needed are part of the transaction
cost.

small.

We address each of these in turn. We apologize
if these appear obvious after explanation; a

review of the literature and of recently at-

tempted information systems reveals that they
The transaction cost approach to the study of in.
dustrial organization is more complex and sub_

are not yet common knowledge among academic
researchers, systems architects, or strategic

final word on industry organization.

The first point claims that systems cannot be

tle than portrayed here. Moreover, the approach is controversial and is surely not the
The ap-

planners.

proach, however, is very intriguing for the pur-

strategic unless they fill some need, either by

pose of suggesting hypotheses regarding the strategic importance and effects of telecommunications
systems and information systems
generally. In the case of McKesson, it is pretty

reducing costs or providing improved service to
users. The current failure of home banking and
videotex services demonstrates the need to fill
some customer need and the penalty of failing to

ing stock is a transaction, the cost of which was
dramatically lowered by the information system
in question. We believe that lowering of trans-

and McKesson Drug Company illustrates the
benefit to be gained by reducing either hard
financial costs or perceived transaction costs, or

obvious that monitoring inventory and reorder-

do so. The success of American Hospital Supply
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by providing improved and differentiated service.

vantage, we require that the body of early adopters be large. This, in turn, requires that the

Systems that fill a need and provide real benefit,

and do so at reasonable cost, will create demand.
They will, in some cases, increase the
innovator's market share, and in other cases will
grow the product or service market or create a
new market for an entirely new product or service. This is unlikely to yield sustainable advantage unless the innovator's gains can De
protected against incursions from competitors.
As such protection for distribution systems and
other services is rarely available through
patents-neither services nor processes are
eligible for patent protection--the innovator will
usually retain its gains only if the customer can
be persuaded not to move to a new supplier.
Several mechanisms exist for protecting the cus-

tomer base, ranging from constant improvement

by the original offerer to sanctions against
The most effective
defectors.4
mechanism to date has been customers' switching costs. A customer who changes suppliers of

potential

an electronic service- a travel agent, an indus-

trial purchasing agent, a user of a cash management account-forfeits a large, and largely unrecoverable, idiosyncratic investment. This investment may include any or all of the following: procurement of special purpose hardware;

development of software interfaces to connect
the customer's computer application systems to
those of the service provider; entering customer
data such as inventory on hand and prices, or

current portfolio; and training of order entry
clerks or other personnel. Only if there is some
significant switching cost or other means of
holding early users can the initial developer ex-

rate of adoption of the system be rapid when
compared to the rate at which competitors can
copy it. If adoption is rapid, and competitors

respond
slowly,
then effect
there will
be, at least
initially, only
a first
mover
providing
real
benefit to early developers. If, in addition, the
gains from early adopters can be defended, there
exists the possibility of sustained profit due to
sustainable competitive advantage. Only systems offering sustainable above-market profits
can be said to yield sustainable competitive advantage.

The commonly cited examples of strategic information systems can all be readily seen to satisfy

all three of our criteria. Merrill Lynch's Cash

Management Account provided interest rates
approximately three times that of a passbook
savings account and thus offered real value to
customers. Once a customer's portfolio was entered as a Merrill Lynch CMA, it required sig-

nificant effort by the customer to transfer to
another company, and no real advantage, as
Merrill Lynch continuously improved their
original offering. Finally, adoption was very
rapid as large sums flowed into Merrill Lynch
CMAs within days of introduction, while com-

petitors required nine to eighteen months to
respond. The effects of this combination is
readily apparent: Merrill Lynch provided a
valuable service and acquired an enormous and
valuable customer base rapidly before competitors could respond. Six years later Merrill
Lynch has retained much of this customer base.
The CMA has turned out to be a strategic, and
sustainable, competitive advantage.

pect to receive lasting benefit from interorganizational information systems.
Finally, the ability of innovators to defend their
gains counts for nought if there are no gains to
defend. Thus, not only do we require the ability

Changes Expected in Industry
Organization

adopters if a system is to provide competitive ad-

We provide the following additional hypotheses
concerning the role of communications-based
information systems:

of innovators to defend (and retain) their early

4Travel agents who use Apollo or Sabre benefit from the
halo effect, the benefits that United and American provide
only to agents using their systems. An agency that replaces

its Apollo system with a competitor's offering would lose, for

1. Competitive advantage is more rare
than strategic necessity.

example, the ability to book important business flights at the
last minute, such as Monday morning and Friday evening

United flights between Chicago and New York. This is an
effective sanction discouraging defection to TWA's PARS
system.
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2. The result of innovation may be
change in the structure of the in-

dustry rather than change in the

competitive position of an individual firm. Even for the innovator, change in industry structure may be more significant than
change in the firm's position within
the industry.

depress or eliminate an industry's profits.5

The role of industry standards
The role of industry-wide standards for interorganizational information systems is quite com-

3. The role of industry-wide standards
will be quite significant.

plex. No doubt, if Johnson & Johnson had
foreseen the erosion of their hospital sales and

profits due to incursions from American Hospi-

tai Supply, made possible by the latter's
electronic order entry system, J&J would have
taken defensive action. The most likely form of
defensive action would have been an industry
standard for remote order entry, agreed upon by
J&J and major hospital chains' purchasing
agents. Such standards might have resulted in a

4. Even short-term profitability for the
first mover may be significant as it
may enable the innovator to drive
out or acquire smaller players.

5. Strategic advantage due to benefits
resulting from reduced production
or distribution costs should be ex-

cure almost as bad as the problem it was intended to address. Experience in other indus-

tremely rare.

trial settings implies that such standard systems

These are preliminary hypotheses based on
limited observation and, more heavily, on intui-

tion. We treat each in turn, supporting with
specific cases where possible.

result in more perfect markets and shift power
towards large purchasers. Both phenomena
shave margins and depress profits. However, it
is at least plausible that the presence of industry

standards and the understanding that remote order entry systems could thus provide no sustain-

able competitive advantage would serve to
restrain introduction of such systems. Relationships between industry standards and industry
organization are quite complex and remain an

Competitive advantage vs. strategic

intriguing topic for further research.

necessity
All major banks today offer ATM services to
customers and, as these services are merged

through inter-bank consortia, they cease to
provide differentiation. They clearly do not offer competitive advantage. They are, however, a
strategic necessity, an urban bank without an
ATM network would be at a significant competi-

tive disadvantage.

Other examples exist, and

their number is increasing.

Role of short-term benefits
Even short-term benefits, which cannot be sus-

tained indefinitely, may be strategic if they

provide other advantages. In particular, the initial innovator may use early above-market
profits to acquire small players that recognize
their inability to compete in the new

marketplace.
Change in industry structure
Strategic necessity, combined with large
development costs, may drive small players out

of some industries completely. Alternatively,
they may form consortia-where regulation
permits-in order to share development costs
and thus survive. As communications systems
enable large participants to respond rapidly,

small companies that survived only as flexible
local middlemen may no longer be cost-effective
and may vanish. Electronic distribution systems, by providing a "perfect" market, may
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5Airline

reservation systems have without question increased the relative strength of early developers, American
and United Airlines. There is, however, widespread belief
that by making competitive shopping so easy these systems
have depressed profits for the entire airline industry. Although American and United are very profitable relative to

the average for their industry, it is afl open and probably
unanswerable question whether they are more profitable

than they would have been in the absence of such systems.

Competitive advantage due to production improvements are rare
If our earlier hypothesis concerning necessary
preconditions for sustainable advantage proves
strategic
valid, then opportunities to introduce
systems for production will be quite rare. This

does not mean that systems can never be stra-

tegic in manufacturing organizations.

More-

over, even systems that do not convey competitive advantage may be quite valuable, even essential, in this environment.

Application systems for production of opera-

tions are generally for internal use, and thus
will preclude the relevance of customer switch-

ing costs and related first-mover effects. A competitor that is late to introduce systems that

reduce costs may still have to match the

innovator's lower prices, initially depressing

profits; eventually, though, it too will have its

system in place. The net effect, then, will probably be reduced producer costs and thus lower

prices for customers.

CONCLUSIONS
We suspect that difficulty in locating oppor-

tunities for strategic and competitive uses of information systems may in large part be because
such opportunities are rare. We do not conclude
from thjs that the recent attention given to such
systems or the priority placed on finding opporIn most cases, the
tunities is overstressed.
benefits of these systems will accrue most
heavily only to the first one or two innovators.
We believe--and the evidence supports this

belief--that strategic uses of information techno-

logy share three characteristics: such systems
provide real benefit to users; users incur significant switching costs when changing to sys-

tems offered by a competitor; and adoption time

is short relative to the time a competitor needs to
copy the system, providing early developers with

an opportunity to develop their initial base of
users. Absence of any one of these three characteristics probably precludes sustainable advantage.

There will, however, still be opportunities made
possible by other aspects of a firm's position. A
competitor with a network already in place may

The additional hypotheses presented are
plausible, but more preliminary. They are being
investigated as part of an ongoing Wharton

would be prohibitively expensive without the
network. American Airlines' reservation system
may provide the infrastructure for its real-time
control of operations. This would be prohibitively expensive for a competitor without an existing network. A firm like General Motors
could absorb development costs that would be
infeasible for smaller players like American

telecommunications, and business strategy. This
project is directed by Clemons and involves a
cooperative effort among industrial sponsors
and the Reginald H. Jones Center for Management Policy, Strategy, and Organization.

be able to piggyback new applications that

research

project in

information

systems,

Motors or Chrysler.

There is some preliminary evidence that theory
does not adequately explain firms' current use of
information systems internally, for production,
distribution, or control. Firms differ not only in
their physical resources, but in their human resources, culture, and traditions. This results in
differing abilities and willingness to exploit in-

formation technology. These yield real effects,
although the causes are difficult to quantify in
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